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Striking a Balance: Freedom of the Press Versus Children's
Privacy Interests in Juvenile Dependency Hearings
Kelly Crecco*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 2012, Jerry Sandusky, the now infamous
former Penn State defensive football coach, was sentenced to thirty
to sixty years in prison after being convicted on forty-five counts of
child sexual abuse.' Over the course of fifteen years, Sandusky
sexually abused ten young boys, all of whom had trusted him as a
coach and mentor. While it was later revealed that for several
years many people from Penn State had some level of knowledge of
Sandusky's actions, it was not until 2011 that the public began to
learn of his deplorable conduct after Sandusky was arrested on
charges of sexually abusing eight boys.3 Unsurprisingly, the
Sandusky scandal garnered substantial media attention.
During Sandusky's trial, the press was granted access to the
courtroom, as criminal adult proceedings are presumptively open
under the First Amendment, but was restricted in engaging in live
* Juris Doctor Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law,
2014.
1. Josh Levs & Laura Dolan, Sandusky Gets at Least 30 Years for Child
Sex Abuse, CNN (Oct. 9, 2012, 6:17 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/09/j ustice/
pennsylvania-sandusky-sentencing/index.html. The judge ruled that Sandusky
would not be eligible for parole for thirty years and set his maximum sentence
at sixty years. Id.
2. See id.
3. Justin Sablich, Ford Fessenden, & Alan McLean, Timeline: The Penn
State Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/1 1/11/
sports/ncaafootball/sandusky.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2013).
4. Larry Cohen & Pamela Mejia, Reporters Can Do Better: New Report
on Media Coverage of Sandusky, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 12, 2012, 1:35 pm),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/larry/reporters-can-do-better-
m-b_1199497.html.
reporting, such as tweeting, updating websites, or communicating
via text or email with those outside the courtroom.5 The coverage
of the trial was extensive, and, at times, accounts of the courtroom
proceedings were shaded with hyperbole. One constant throughout
the reporting though was the press' protection of the privacy rights
of Sandusky's victims who were only ever identified as Victim No.
1, Victim No. 2, and so on,7 despite the fact that their names were
readily available to the press.8 The involvement of the press not
only shed light on Sandusky's crimes, but also raised significant
awareness on the sensitive topic of child sexual abuse.9
Commentators on the media coverage of the Sandusky trial noted
"[t]he Penn State scandal is just the most recent and public instance
of a crime that happens every day," and having the press cover this
type of case can help bring preventive reform.10
Although the Sandusky case involved adult criminal
proceedings, the subject matter was very similar to that typically
5. Sara Ganim, Live Reporting Not Allowed from Courtroom in Jerry
Sandusky Case After Media Question Judge Order, PATRIOT-NEWS,
http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2012/06/tweeting-no-1ongerallo
wedin.html (last updated June 4, 2012, 9:51 AM) ("Judge John Cleland
reversed his own ruling that would have allowed such transmissions, as long as
they weren't direct quotes, after media organizations asked him to reconsider
citing concern about what a direct quote meant and how reports would remain
accurate.").
6. George Solomon, Slow to React, AMERICAN JOURNALISM REVIEW
(Nov. 21, 2011), http://www.ajr.org/article.asp?id=5178. In his review of the
press coverage of the Penn State scandal, Solomon notes that "[iut's been
compared to the priest scandal that has rocked the Catholic Church for the
last 25 years," and "[i]n the world of sports, the child sexual abuse story
embroiling Penn State has drawn parallels to the death of superstar basketball
player Len Bias, Magic Johnson testing HIV positive and the steroid
controversy that engulfed Major League Baseball players." Id.
7. See Levs & Dolan, supra note 1.
8. Daniel Heimpel, A Time for Trust, CHRONICLE OF SOCIAL CHANGE
(July 2, 2012), http://chronicleofsocialchange.wordpress.com/2012/07/02/a-
time-for-trust/ ("A clear example of the press respecting confidentiality was
throughout the recent Jerry Sandusky saga. Journalists had access to the
names of Sandusky's victims, but did not release them to the public.").
9. Cohen & Mejia, supra note 4.
10. Id.
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involved in juvenile dependency proceedings.' Sandusky's victims
were children at the time of the abuse, and this same type of
scenario is present in dependency proceedings every day.12 Often
the children involved in dependency cases were either abused,
sexually or otherwise, by their own parents, or were abused by
someone else due to the neglect of their parents." The reporting
response to the Sandusky case, which was both ethical and
informative, demonstrates how the press can still report the facts
while simultaneously respecting the confidentiality of the victims. 14
11. See What are the Charges Against Jerry Sandusky?, CNN (June 12,
2012, 10:17 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/21/justice/pennsylvania-
sandusky-charges/index.html (reporting that Sandusky was charged with "48
counts of child sexual abuse involving 10 alleged victims").
12. Jerry Sandusky, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2012),
http://topics.nytimes.com/top
/reference/timestopics/people/s/jerry-sanduskylindex.html. The jury ultimately
found that Sandusky had sexually abused "10 young boys, all of them from
disadvantaged homes." Id.
13. In the Juvenile Code section of the North Carolina General Statutes,
which provides laws governing juvenile dependency proceedings, the first
definition in the definitions subchapter of the statute is the definition of
"abused juveniles." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-101(1)(a)-(b) (2012). An abused
juvenile is "[any juvenile less than 18 years of age whose parent, guardian,
custodian, or caretaker [ilnflicts or allows to be inflicted upon the juvenile a
serious physical injury by other than accidental means," or "[c]reates or allows
to be created a substantial risk of serious physical injury to the juvenile by
other than accidental means." Id.
14. For instance, when the public learned that the eight victims that
agreed to testify at trial would have to state their names for the record before
the entire courtroom, The Patriot-News, a central Pennsylvania-based media
outlet that comprehensively reported on the Sandusky trial through its website
PennLive, vowed not to repeat the victims' names. The Patriot -News
announced:
Throughout our coverage of the former Penn State
coach's criminal trial, we will stand by our long-held
policy to not identify alleged victims of sexual assault,
whatever their age or gender, unless they themselves
choose to go public. We also will try to avoid providing
any details about their lives that could readily lead to
them being uncovered. We will take precautions to avoid
photographing any of the eight, who are now young men.
492 [Vol. 11I
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When reporters do their jobs correctly, the benefit to the
public can be enormous. The press is able to shed light on issues,
like the horrors of the Sandusky case, that otherwise would go
unnoticed by the public, potentially leading to positive societal
changes. 5 This Note argues that like adult criminal proceedings, all
juvenile dependency proceedings should, under the guarantees of
the First Amendment, be presumptively open to the press" unless
there are legitimate, compelling reasons why the courtroom should
be closed, including the child's request that the proceeding be
closed. As will be detailed further below, there are two competing
interests that are at the forefront of the debate over press access to
juvenile dependency proceedings." On one side, opponents argue
that allowing press access to the courtroom infringes upon the
privacy rights of the children, while on the other side, proponents
argue that the press enjoys a First Amendment right to report on
these proceedings. 8 The solution proposed above of presumptive
openness serves to satisfy both the proponents and the opponents
of open dependency hearings.
In order to effectively formulate this argument for
presumptively open juvenile dependency proceedings, the
remainder of this Note is divided into five parts. Part II addresses
the history of the dependency court and the history of press access
to the courtroom. Part III discusses the state of open dependency
courtrooms in California, one of the most recent states to confront
the debate over openness. Part IV presents the arguments for and
against open juvenile dependency proceedings. Part V explains why
juvenile dependency courtrooms should be open with certain
Jerry Sandusky Trial: Why We Won't Identify Alleged Sex-Crime Victims,
PATRIOT-NEWS (June 11, 2012, 1:02 AM),
http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2012/
06/jerry-sandusky-trial-why-we-wo.html.
15. Heimpel, supra note 8. There is a strong argument "that the news
media's ability to promote positive social change amount to a 'legitimate
interest' in the proceedings and thus sanction journalist access." See id.
16. As will be discussed in more detail below, some jurisdictions already
permit presumptively open juvenile dependency proceedings, but this Note
argues that all jurisdictions should be presumptively open.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See infra Parts IVA-B.
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conditions imposed in order to preserve the interests of the children
involved. Lastly, Part VI concludes this Note by summarizing why
presumptively open juvenile dependency hearings provide the most
favorable option for both the children involved and the press.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. History of Dependency Courts
In 1899, the State of Illinois established the United States'
first juvenile court. 9 The purpose of the early juvenile court was to
provide legal assistance to delinquent children as well as pre-
delinquent children, and typically, this latter category encompassed
dependent children.20 Dependent children are children under
eighteen years old who have been physically or sexually abused,
neglected, or abandoned by their parent or guardian. 2' Thus, all
children -whether delinquent, abused, neglected, or abandoned-
were grouped together in one court.22 The U.S. juvenile court
system adopted the nineteenth century parens patriae system,
functioning as protector of both delinquent and dependent
24
children. Under this parens patriae authority, the early juvenile
court was designed to "function as a centralized agency responsible
19. See Marvin Ventrell, Evolution of the Dependency Component of the
Juvenile Court, 49 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 17, 26 (1998) (citing Act of Apr. 21,
1899, [1899] Ill. Laws 131). The Illinois Legislature implemented "An Act to
Regulate the Treatment and Control of Dependent, Neglected and
Delinquent Children," which led to the creation of the juvenile court. Illinois
Juvenile Court Act, 1899 111. Laws 131 (repealed 1965).
20. Kathleen S. Bean, Changing the Rules: Public Access to Dependency
Court, 79 DENv. U. L. REv. 1, 30-31 (2001).
21. Jennifer Flint, Comment, Who Should Hold the Key?: An Analysis of
Access and Confidentiality in Juvenile Dependency Courts, 28 J. Juv. L. 45, 46
(2007).
22. See Bean, supra note 20, at 30.
23. Parens patriae is defined as "the state in its capacity as provider of
protection to those unable to care for themselves." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1221 (9th ed. 2009).
24. Ventrell, supra note 19, at 27.
494 [Vol. 11I
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for all such children from start to finish," and the court was
commonly thought to maintain a "child saving" mission.
However, the scope of a court's parens patriae authority
drastically changed following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
In re Gault.26 The case came before the Court after Gerald Gault, a
fifteen-year-old boy, was arrested and taken to the Children's
Detention Home due to a complaint from a neighbor that Gerald
and one of his friends made indecent remarks to her over the
telephone.2 During the course of his arrest, his time at the
detention center, and his court hearings, Gerald was denied many
procedural due process rights that are normally afforded adults.2 8
Among other claims, the Court addressed the procedural due
process rights of juveniles as compared to those of adults. In a
majority opinion delivered by Justice Abe Fortas, the Court found
that "the Juvenile Court Judge's exercise of the power of the state
as parens patriae was not unlimited" and that due process applies to
children just as it applies to adults.3 o
One commentator describes the impact of this case in his
article: "[w]hile Gault did not instruct juvenile courts across the
country to wholly substitute adult criminal procedure for juvenile
practice, that is very much what happened."3 ' Following the Court's
decision in Gault, parens patriae authority essentially disappeared
from the delinquency court context, separating the delinquency
25. Id. (noting that although it was the intention of the court to exercise
parens patriae authority over dependent juveniles, there were many
shortcomings in the system- especially given that dependent and delinquent
children were all under the authority of one court-that consequently
hindered the court in effectively carrying out its "child saving" philosophy).
26. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
27. Id. at 4-5.
28. Id. at 10. The Court was asked to consider whether Gerald was
denied various due process rights, including notice of charges, right to counsel,
right to confrontation and cross-examination, privilege against self-
incrimination, right to transcript of the proceedings, and right to appellate
review. Id.
29. Id. at 13-14.
30. Id. at 30-31.
31. Ventrell, supra note 19, at 28 (emphasis added).
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32
court from the dependency court. This separation was necessary,
as delinquent children and dependent children fall under different
legal classifications and have different legal interests, and, as such,
they should have separate legal courts.33 While delinquent children
are the offenders who have violated the law, dependent children
are the victims of law violations, including neglect and abuse.34
Once the dependency court became its own entity,
dependent children remained the beneficiaries of the court's parens
patriae authority, but society no longer saw these children as pre-
delinquents. Instead, they saw them instead as children in need of
protection from maltreatment. With this new perspective, federal
and state legislatures passed new statutes related to dependent
36
children, and as a result, the juvenile dependency court became,
and remains today, the principal setting for addressing child abuse
and neglect cases.37 The most common types of hearings that take
place in dependency courtrooms are adjudications,8 dispositions,39
reviews,40 permanency planning," and termination of parental
32. Id.
33. See Veena Srinivasa, Note, Sunshine for D.C.'s Children: Opening
Dependency Court Proceedings and Records, 18 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. &
POL'Y 79, 82-83 (2010).
34. Id. at 82.
35. See id.
36. See John E.B. Myers, A Short History of Child Protection in America,
42 FAM. L.Q. 449, 455-60 (2008) (discussing many important pieces of
legislation, including the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974,
the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, and the Adoption
and Safe Families Act of 1997).
37. Ventrell, supra note 19, at 30.
38. See Kella W. Hatcher, Janet Mason & John Rubin, ABUSE,
NEGLECT, AND TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS PROCEEDINGS IN NORTH
CAROLINA 1, 158 (2011) ("'Adjudication' refers both to the hearing at which
the court determines the existence or nonexistence of the facts alleged in the
petition, and to the court's action when it concludes as a matter of law that a
child is an abused, neglected, or dependent juvenile.").
39. Id. at 207 ("The disposition hearing takes place immediately after or
within 30 days of the adjudication hearing.").
40. Id. ("When custody is removed from a parent, guardian, custodian, or
caretaker, a review hearing must take place within 90 days of the disposition.
Subsequent review hearings are required at maximum intervals of 6 months
[Vol. 11496 FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW
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rights.42 The main goal of the modern dependency court is to serve
the best interests of the child involved in these proceedings while
also, to the extent reasonably possible, preserving the autonomy of
the family.
Since the formation of the first juvenile court in 1899, the
dependency court has evolved considerably. In general, modern
adult criminal courts are open to the public under the guarantees of
the First Amendment," but the Supreme Court has never directly
addressed whether juvenile courts should be open to the public as
well. Despite the Court's silence on this matter, there are many
strong arguments for why juvenile dependency courts should be
presumptively open.45 A brief examination of the history of press
and public access to both adult and juvenile courtrooms is a helpful
guide for articulating these arguments. Throughout this history, the
press has "enjoy[ed] the same right of access as the public."46
for as long as the child remains out of the home, and review hearings may be
held at any time on motion of a party.").
41. Id. ("Within 12 months of a child's initial removal from the home,
which may have been pursuant to a nonsecure custody order before
adjudication, a special review hearing designated as a 'permanency planning
hearing' must be held in order to ensure that a plan is in place to return the
child home or achieve another safe, permanent home for the child within a
reasonable period of time.").
42. Id. at 235 ("Termination of parental rights (TPR) is the state's
ultimate interference into the constitutionally protected parent-child
relationship, severing all legal ties between the parent and the child. TPR may
occur only if the court finds by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that at
least one statutory ground for termination exists and also finds that
terminating the parent's rights is in the child's best interest. All TPR
proceedings are in juvenile court, before a district court judge without a
jury.").
43. Id. at 31.
44. See generally Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555
(1980); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
45. See infra, Part IV.B.
46. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 572-73 (The Court prefaces
that: "Instead of acquiring information about trials by firsthand observation or
by word of mouth from those who attended, people now acquire it chiefly
through the print and electronic media. In a sense, this validates the media
claim of functioning as surrogates for the public."); see also Lawrence J.
Morris, Constitutional Law - Closure of Trials - The Press and the Public
2013] 497
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B. History of Press Access to the Courtroom
1. Press Access to Adult Proceedings
While the issue of public accesse to juvenile hearings
remains an open debate,48 the issue of public access to adult
proceedings has long been settled."9 In Richmond Newspapers, Inc.
v. Virginia,50 the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether the public
Have a First Amendment Right of Access to Attend Criminal Trials, Which
Cannot Be Closed Absent an Overriding Interest. Richmond Newspapers, Inc.
v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980), 64 MARQ. L. REV. 717, 730 (1980 - 1981)
("The clear consensus of cases dealing with 'fair trials - free press' issues is
that even though the press can be limited in certain (usually clearly outlined)
circumstances, the Court begins with a presumption of maximum protection of
the press in its role as conduit of information for the people.").
47. While the central focus of this Note is press access to juvenile
dependency proceedings, many courts and legal scholars refer to this access
more generally as public access since public access typically comes with press
access. For instance, the press has been referred to as the public's "surrogate."
See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 572-73; see also Samuel Broderick
Sokol, Comment, Trying Dependency Cases in Public: A First Amendment
Inquiry, 45 UCLA L. REV. 881, 883 (1998). Therefore, for purposes of this
Note, press access and public access refer to the same concept.
48. Again, this Note focuses on press and public access to juvenile
dependency proceedings, but it is important to point out that just as the U.S.
Supreme Court has never recognized a public right of access to juvenile
dependency proceedings, it has also never recognized this right of access to
juvenile delinquency proceedings. Courtney R. Clark, Note, Collateral
Damage: How Closing Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings Flouts the
Constitution and Fails to Benefit the Child, 46 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 199, 201
(2007) ("[T]he Supreme Court has ruled on several related topics, barely
sidestepping the issue of the constitutionality of limiting public access to
juvenile courtroom proceedings. Skirting the issue of whether banning public
and media access to juvenile court hearings compromises the media or the
public's constitutional rights, the Court has methodically extended the media's
right to witness criminal trials over recent decades. . . . [T]he absence of a
Supreme Court holding and national legislation has allowed each state to
legislate and enforce its own variation of juvenile court proceedings, which
vary greatly from state to state and are flooded with ambiguity.").
49. See Sokol, supra note 47, at 884; see also supra note 46 and
accompanying text.
50. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
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has a constitutionally guaranteed right to attend criminal trials."
The case was brought before the Court after two reporters for
Richmond Newspapers, Inc., were excluded from attending a
murder trial after the trial judge granted a motion to have the trial
closed to the public. The reporters argued that their constitutional
rights to attend the trial should have been considered before the
lower court ordered closure."
The Court held that the right of the public to attend
criminal trials "may be seen as assured by the amalgam of the First
Amendment guarantees of speech and press."5 4 The plurality
opinion provided two important justifications for the public's right
to attend criminal trials. First, the opinion argued that historically,
courts have been open to the public. 55 Second, the opinion
recognized that public attendance helps to ensure fairness in the
courtroom." This latter reason for openness is particularly relevant
in the context of juvenile dependency proceedings, as described
more thoroughly below.57
Just two years after its decision in Richmond Newspapers,
the Court again upheld the First Amendment right of public access
to criminal trials in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court.58
51. Id. at 564.
52. Id. at 559-62.
53. Id. at 560.
54. Id. at 577.
55. Id. at 569 (plurality opinion) ("[The historical evidence
demonstrates conclusively that at the time when our organic laws were
adopted, criminal trials both here and in England had long been
presumptively open.").
56. Id. at 578 (plurality opinion). Chief Justice Warren Burger described
the courtroom as a public place where the "people generally-and
representatives of the media-have a right to be present, and where their
presence historically has been thought to enhance the integrity and quality of
what takes place." Id.
57. See infra Parts IV.B.1-2.
58. 457 U.S. 596 (1982). In this case, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court interpreted a Massachusetts statute as requiring "trial judges, at trials
for specified sexual offenses involving a victim under the age of 18, to exclude
the press and general public from the courtroom during the testimony of that
victim." Id. at 598. In response, Globe Newspaper Company, a media outlet
that tried and failed to gain access to the entire trial, including the portion
2013] 499
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Following the precedent of Richmond Newspapers, the Court
emphasized that "the criminal trial historically has been open to the
press and general public" and that "the right of access to criminal
trials plays a particularly significant role in the functioning of the
judicial process and the government as a whole."59 Not only did the
Globe opinion reaffirm Richmond Newspapers, but it also specified
that public access to criminal trials cannot be barred unless "the
denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is
narrowly tailored to serve that interest."a
In Globe, the state interests presented to support the
Massachusetts statute that barred press and public access to
criminal sex-offense trials when minor victims took the stand were
twofold: (1) "the protection of minor victims of sex crimes from
further trauma and embarrassment" and (2) "the encouragement of
such victims to come forward and testify in a truthful and credible
manner."6 ' The Court found the State's first asserted interest
compelling, but reasoned that although compelling, this interest did
not necessitate a mandatory closure rule since the significance of
the interest will vary from case to case. 62 As for the State's second
asserted interest, the Court found that "[n]ot only is the claim
speculative in empirical terms, but it is also open to serious question
as a matter of logic and common sense."6 1 Ultimately, the Court
held that the statute's mandatory closure provision violated the
First Amendment.64 Since its decisions in Richmond Newspapers
where the victim testified, appealed the case to the U.S. Supreme Court. Id. at
601-02. The Court found that the Supreme Judicial Court's construction of
the statute violated the First Amendment. Id.
59. Id. at 605-06. The Court went on to add that "[plublic scrutiny of a
criminal trial enhances the quality and safeguards the integrity of the
factfinding process" and that "public access to the criminal trial fosters an
appearance of fairness, thereby heightening public respect for the judicial
process." Id. at 606.
60. Id. at 607.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 607-08 (holding that "as compelling as that interest is, it does
not justify a mandatory closure rule, for it is clear that circumstances of the
particular case may affect the significance of the interest").
63. Id. at 609-10.
64. Id. at 610-11.
500 [Vol. 11I
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and Globe, the Supreme Court has only ruled specifically on the
right of access three other times, most recently in 1993, and each
time the Court upheld the public's right to access under the First
Amendment.65
From this Supreme Court precedent, it is unambiguous that
the public has a First Amendment right of access to criminal trials,
except in those rare circumstances where there is a compelling state
interest in denying access and denial is narrowly tailored to serve
the state's interest. The Supreme Court has never extended this
right of access to civil trials, but several circuit courts have extended
the right of access in those proceedings. For instance, in Publicker
65. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal. (Press-Enterprise 1), 464
U.S. 501 (1984). In this case, only three days of voir dire were held open to the
public while the remaining six weeks were closed. Id. at 510. The Court held
that this was unconstitutional, highlighting that "[t]he presumption of
openness may be overcome only by an overriding interest based on findings
that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to
serve that interest." Id. The Court concluded that "[e]ven with findings
adequate to support closure, the trial court's orders denying access to voir dire
testimony failed to consider whether alternatives were available to protect the
interests of the prospective jurors that the trial court's orders sought to
guard," and by failing to do so, closure was unconstitutional. Id. at 511. See
also Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal. (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1
(1986). This case involved a lower court's decision to keep a forty-one day
preliminary hearing of a capital murder trial closed. Id. at 4. The Court found
that the First Amendment right of access to criminal trials applies to
preliminary hearings and held that complete closure of this forty-one day
proceeding was unconstitutional. Id. at 13. In reaching this holding the Court
reasoned that a "conclusory assertion that publicity might deprive the
defendant" of the right to a fair trial was not a compelling interest, and that
even if it was compelling, "any limitation must be 'narrowly tailored to serve
that interest."' Id. at 15 (citing Press Enterprise 1, 464 U.S. at 510.). See also El
Vocero de Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147 (1993). Following Press-
Enterprise II, the Court stated that although the lower court's worry that
publicity would prejudice the defendant's fair trial rights was legitimate, "this
concern can and must be addressed on a case-by-case basis." Id. at 151. The
Court then determined that the Puerto Rico Supreme Court's decision to deny
press access to the preliminary hearing of an accused felon was improper in
this case. Id.
66. See Sokol, supra note 47, at 895-97 (citing Rushford v. New Yorker
Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249 (4th Cir. 1988); Publicker Industries, Inc. v.
Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984); Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad Sys.,
2013]1 501
Industries, Inc. v. Cohen, the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit found that the reasoning supporting open criminal trials was
correspondingly pertinent to civil trials." During a district court
hearing involving petitions for temporary injunctions, the court
ruled to exclude reporters from the Philadelphia Inquirer, which is
published by Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. ("PNI"), and the Wall
Street Journal, which is published by Dow Jones & Company, Inc.
("Dow Jones")." In response to this ruling, PNI and Dow Jones
argued that this exclusion of the public and press "deprived them of
their common law and First Amendment rights of access to a civil
trial without due process of law."70 Finding for the press, the Third
Circuit concluded that "the public and the press possess a First
Amendment and a common law right of access to civil proceedings;
indeed, there is a presumption that these proceedings will be
open."
This Third Circuit's decision has been expressly followed by
the Second Circuit,72 as well as by district courts within the First,
Fifth,74 Ninth," and D.C. Circuits.76 Additionally, the Sixth77 and
Inc., 752 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1984); Brown v. Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC,
710 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir. 1983); In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig. 732 F.2d 1302
(7th Cir. 1984); Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 933 F. Supp. 647 (S.D. Tex.
1996)).
67. 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984).
68. Id. at 1069-70.
69. Id. at 1063.
70. Id. at 1064.
71. Id. at 1071.
72. See Westmoreland v. CBS, 752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir. 1984) ("[W]e
agree with the Third Circuit in Publicker Industries, supra, that the First
Amendment does secure to the public and to the press a right of access to civil
proceedings in accordance with the dicta of the Justices in Richmond
Newspapers.").
73. See Nat'l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, No. 09-538-B-H, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 90749, at *10-11 (D. Me. Aug. 24, 2010) (citing to Publicker, the
court found that "there can be little doubt that civil trials have traditionally
been open to the public and that the public's right of access to trial evidence
pertaining to the vindication of First Amendment rights is comparable to the
right of access to criminal trials").
74. See Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 933 F. Supp. 647, 650 (S.D.
Tex. 1996) (concluding that in light of the holdings reached by other Circuit
Courts, including the Third Circuit in Publicker, "the right of the public to
502 FIRST AMENDMENT LA W RE VIEW [Vol. 11I
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Seventh Circuits78 have recognized a public right to access in civil
proceedings, and the Fourth Circuit has implicitly recognized the
same right. 9 However, the Eighth," Tenth,8' and Eleventh Circuits
have not yet directly addressed this issue.82 While not every federal
court has weighed in on this question, it is clear that those courts
that have agree that civil proceedings, like criminal proceedings,
should be presumptively open to the press and the public. It is time
for this presumption of openness that has become widely accepted
in both criminal and civil courtrooms to apply in juvenile
dependency courtrooms as well.
attend civil trials is grounded in the First Amendment as well as the common
law").
75. See U.S. v. Garvey Schubert Barer, No. 06-MC-9021-BR, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8627, at *9-10 (D. Or. Feb. 2, 2007) (citing to Publicker the court
concluded that "the policy reasons for granting public access to criminal
proceedings also apply to a proceeding such as this one, and, therefore, the
Court applies the standards for criminal proceedings to determine whether the
described materials should remain sealed").
76. See In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 630 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.C.
Cir. 2009) (citing to Publicker to remark that "[w]hile the D.C. Circuit has
been silent on the issue, other Circuits have opined and uniformly held that
the public has a First Amendment right of access to civil proceedings and
records").
77. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1178
(6th Cir. 1983) ("The Supreme Court's analysis of the justifications for access
to the criminal courtroom apply as well to the civil trial."), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1100 (1984).
78. See In re Cont'l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (6th Cir. 1984)
("[W]e agree with the Sixth Circuit that the policy reasons for granting public
access to criminal proceedings apply to civil cases as well. These policies relate
to the public's right to monitor the functioning of our courts, thereby insuring
quality, honesty and respect for our legal system.") (citations omitted).
79. Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir.
1988) (citing to Publicker and In re Continental, the court found that "the
more rigorous First Amendment standard should also apply to documents
filed in connection with a summary judgment motion in a civil case").
80. See Sokol, supra note 47, at 897 (citing Webster Groves Sch. Dist. v.
Pulitzer Publ'g Co., 898 F.2d 1371, 1374 (8th Cir. 1990)).
81. See id. (citing Soc'y of Prof'1 Journalists v. Sec'y of Labor, 832 F.2d
1180 (10th Cir. 1987)).
82. See id. (citing Simmons v. Conger, 86 F.3d 1080, 1087 n.3 (11th Cir.
1996)).
2. Press Access to Juvenile Dependency Proceedings
Unlike the cases clearly supporting a public right of access
to adult court proceedings, the case law surrounding public access
to juvenile court proceedings, particularly dependency hearings, is
much less straightforward. In San Bernardino County Department
of Public Social Services v. Superior Court,83 the San Bernardino
County Department of Public Social Services ("DPSS") filed a
petition to have the minor children of two parents deemed
dependent due to reports of abuse and neglect inflicted by the
parents." Upon hearing about the case, the Sun Newspaper ("the
Sun") requested access to the juvenile court's records regarding the
minor children. While the court denied the Sun access to the court
records, it did allow the Sun to attend the dependency
proceedings." Subsequently, DPSS filed a petition for a writ of
mandamus, claiming that the court abused its discretion in
permitting the Sun to attend the proceedings." In deciding whether
the juvenile court abused its discretion, the California Court of
Appeals had to determine "whether the press and the public have a
constitutional right to attend juvenile court dependency
proceedings."88 The court answered this question in the negative,
reasoning that because there is not an extensive history of open
hearings in juvenile court, there is no First Amendment guarantee
of access to juvenile proceedings."
Despite this holding,? the San Bernardino court by no
means prohibited the possibility of open dependency proceedings.91
Rather, the court asserted that California courts have the discretion
83. 283 Cal. Rptr. 3d 332 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
84. Id. at 335.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 336.
89. Id. at 339-40 (citing Florida Pub. Co. v. Morgan, 253 Ga. 467 (Ga.
1984); In re T.R., 556 N.E.2d 439 (Ohio 1990); Matter of N.H.B., 769 P.2d 844
(Utah Ct. App. 1989); In re J.S., 140 Vt. 458 (Vt. 1981)).
90. Id. at 343.
91. Id. at 344-45.
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to allow the press to attend these hearings and recognized that
there are significant benefits to open dependency proceedings.
For instance, the court agreed with the Sun's argument that public
access can have a positive impact on the operation of the juvenile
court.93 The court explained that "[t]o the extent public proceedings
serve the twin goals of assuring fairness and giving the appearance
of fairness, the societal values of public access first recognized in
the criminal context can be beneficial to juvenile court proceedings
as well." 94 In addition, the court reasoned that "[a]ccess may also
serve to check judicial abuse."95 In the last full paragraph of its
opinion, the court reasoned that though the juvenile court is not
constitutionally required to permit press access, "the court should
allow press access unless there is a reasonable likelihood that such
access will be harmful to the child's or children's best interest in this
case." 96
Although San Bernardino, which was decided in 1991, held
that there is not a constitutional right of public access to juvenile
proceedings, it nonetheless expressed the premise that courts could,
in their discretion, still allow press and public access to the
proceedings.97 Since the time that case was decided, there has been
a gradual movement towards allowing more access to dependency
courts.98 This shift has been occurring on a state-by-state, and
sometimes a court-by-court, basis over the past thirty years.
92. Id. at 345.
93. Id. at 340.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 341. The court went on to say that "[b]ecause juvenile
proceedings, in particular dependency proceedings, are civil in nature and
intended to be rehabilitative instead of punitive, admittedly there is less
concern of unjust convictions against which public access might serve as a
check." Id.
96. Id. at 345 (citing Brian W. v. Super. Ct., 20 Cal. 3d 618, 624 (Cal.
1978)).
97. Id. at 343.
98. See infra notes 90-101 and accompanying text.
99. As detailed in the subsequent paragraphs, Oregon became the first
state to expressly adopt a presumption of openness in 1979, and many states
soon followed suit. See infra notes 83-101 and accompanying text.
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One of the first states to apply an open-door approach to
juvenile proceedings was Oregon.'" The Oregon Supreme Court
addressed the issue of public access to juvenile courts in State ex rel
Oregonian Publishing Co. v. Deiz.'o' In that case, a juvenile court
judge barred a reporter employed by The Oregonian from
attending a juvenile hearing of a thirteen-year-old girl who was
possibly involved in the drowning of a younger child.'" The
Oregonian argued that "the press should be found to have a 'proper
interest' in the case because it is important for the public to be
informed about the workings of the juvenile justice system and the
press informs the public." 03 The issue left for the Oregon Supreme
Court to consider was whether the press had a right to attend all
hearings in connection with the case.'" The court found that the
judge's complete exclusion of the press from the proceedings was
invalid under the state's constitution. 5 At the end of the opinion,
the court made certain to note that its holding "should not be
interpreted as guaranteeing the right of public access to all judicial
proceedings;" rather, "the trial court retains the right to control
access by members of the press or public who would overcrowd the
courtroom, attempt to interfere in the proceedings or otherwise
obstruct the proceedings."'0 Even with these limitations, the court's
decision was a significant step forward, as the holding essentially
"removed all locks from Oregon courtroom doors."' 7
100. Flint, supra note 21, at 57 (citing Barbara White Stack, Oregon's
Constitution Unlocks Juvenile Courts, POST-GAZErE.COM Sept. 23, 2001,
http://old.post-gazette.com/headlines/200tO923challengesO923P9.asp).
101. 613 P.2d 23 (Or. 1980).
102. Id. at 24-25.
103. Id. at 25.
104. Id. at 24,
105. Id. at 26-27. Article 1, Section 10 of the Oregon Constitution states:
"No court shall be secret, but justice shall be administered, openly and without
purchase, completely and without delay...." Or. Const. art. I, § 10.
106. Deiz, 613 P.2d at 27.
107. Flint, supra note 21, at 59.
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Almost two decades after Oregon presumptively opened all
of its juvenile courts, New York opened its family courts." In 1997,
the Chief Judge of New York ordered that all family courts in the
state, which handle dependency cases among other matters, be
presumptively open to the press and the public.'" In announcing
the new rules to be adopted by all the family courtrooms in the
state, the Chief Judge explained "that the Family Court had played
an increasingly prominent role in recent years and that as an
important public institution, it required public scrutiny."o Under
this new presumption of openness, judges would still maintain the
discretion to close the courtroom in certain cases, but only if
compelling reasons existed for doing so."' The New York City Bar
agreed with this decision, finding that it brought "the state's family
courts into alignment with the Supreme Court decisions over the
last twenty years regarding public access.""i2
Then, in 2003, six years after New York opened its family
courts, the Pennsylvania Superior Court,"3 relying on its state
constitution, expressly declared that "the constitutional
presumption of openness applies to juvenile dependency
108. See Alan Finder, Chief Judge in New York Tells Family Courts to
Admit Public, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1997,
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/06/19/nyregion/
chief-judge-in-new-york-tells-family-courts-to-admit-public.html.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. One such compelling and specific reason for closing hearings
would be "insuring the privacy of a child who was the victim of sexual abuse."
Id.
112. See Emily Metzgar, Neither Seen Nor Heard: Media in America's
Juvenile Courts, 12 CoMM. L. & POL'Y 177, 186 (2007) (citing Association of
the Bar of the City of New York, Committee on Communications and Media
Law, Open to the Public: The Effect of Presumptive Public Access to New York
State's Family Courts, 22 COMM. & THE LAW 4 (2000)).
113. The Pennsylvania Superior Court is one of two intermediate
appellate courts in the state that falls right below the highest court in the state,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania, THE
UNIFIED JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF PENNSYLVANIA,
http://www.pacourts.us/T/SuperiorCourt/
default.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2013).
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matters."1 4 The court provided that in order for the party
attempting to keep the dependency proceedings closed to rebut the
presumption of openness, that party must demonstrate "that: (1)
the denial of public access serves an important governmental
interest, and (2) no less restrictive means to serve that interest
exists."" 5
In keeping with the trend toward openness, Florida "acted
to remove the dependency system's veil of confidentiality.""'
However, instead of relying on the judiciary to remove this veil,
Florida's legislature passed a statute providing for a presumption of
openness in dependency proceedings."' Specifically, the current
Florida law provides that:
All hearings, except as provided in this section,
shall be open to the public, and a person may
not be excluded except on special order of the
judge, who may close any hearing to the public
upon determining that the public interest or the
welfare of the child is best served by so doing."'
The statute clearly articulates that dependency hearings in the state
are presumed to be open unless the judge, in her discretion, decides
that closure is appropriate for protecting the best interests of the
child or the public interest." 9
Rather than automatically adopting open proceedings-
either by judicial decision or by state statute -a few states initiated
pilot programs to decide whether to implement statewide open
juvenile dependency proceedings.12 0 In 1998, Minnesota became the
first state to employ a pilot program following an order from the
114. In re M.B., 819 A.2d 59, 62 (Pa. Super. 2003).
115. Id. at 63.
116. Flint, supra note 21, at 51.
117. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. §39.507(2) (2006)).
118. FLA. STAT. § 39.507(2) (2012).
119. Id.
120. BLAINE ABATE, SOUTHERN AREA CONSORTIUM OF HUMAN
SERVICES, LITERATURE REVIEW: OPEN JUVENILE DEPENDENCY COURTS 14
(2011), available at
http://theacademy.sdsu.edu/programs/SACHS/literature/SACHS%20Lit%20
Review-Open%20%20Courts%20FINAL.pdf.
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Minnesota Supreme Court. 12' The program was executed by the
National Center for State Courts ("NCSC"), and its purpose was
"to provide decision-makers with relevant information to assist
their deliberations regarding whether open hearings/records should
be expanded statewide."l 22 In 2001, after three years of conducting
the pilot program, the NCSC reported that while many
professionals expressed concerns that open dependency hearings
would have harmful effects on the children or parents involved, the
123project team witnessed no such harm. Since the completion of the
pilot project, Minnesota has maintained its status as a
presumptively open dependency hearings state.124
Two years after the conclusion of the Minnesota pilot
project, Arizona initiated its own open court pilot program "to
evaluate the number of court hearings that were open or closed to
the public and to survey courtroom participants on their attitudes
surrounding the open hearing process." 25 The program permitted
121. Id. at 15. The Minnesota Supreme Court authorized "each of
Minnesota's ten judicial districts to identify one or more counties in which to
conduct a three-year pilot project where child protection hearings and court
file records would be accessible to the public," and twelve counties agreed to
participate in the project. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 18 (citing FRED L. CHEESMAN, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE
COURTS, KEY FINDINGS FROM THE EVALUATION OF OPEN HEARINGS AND
COURT RECORDS IN JUVENILE PROTECTION MATTERS, FINAL REPORT 1
(2001)).
124. Following the submission of the NCSC report, the Minnesota
Supreme Court issued a court order instituting presumptively open
dependency courtrooms throughout the state beginning in 2002. See JAMIE
KAPALKO, FOSTERING MEDIA CONNECTIONS, A WATCHED SYSTEM: SHOULD
JOURNALISTS BE GRANTED ACCESS TO JUVENILE DEPENDENCY COURT
PROCEEDINGS? 7 (2012), available at
http://chronicleofsocialchange.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/a-watched-system-
report-sept-17-2012.pdf. Then, in 2008, the Minnesota legislature amended
the juvenile protection statute to reflect the court order. Id. The most recent
version of the statute addressing access to juvenile protection proceedings
reads: "Absent exceptional circumstances, hearings in juvenile protection
matters are presumed to be accessible to the public." MINN. R. Juv. PROT. P.
27.01 (2012).
125. GREGORY BROBERG & VERA LOPEZ, ARIZONA OPEN
DEPENDENCY HEARING PILOT STUDY: FINAL REPORT 15 (2006), available at
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public access in five percent of Maricopa County's'2 6 dependency
cases.' After eighteen months, the final report compiled by
Arizona State University stated that the "'impacts of the pilot
program have been minimal, though caution must be exercised in
assuming too much into this fact based on the low volume of non-
party courtroom attendance."". Though, as the final report noted,
the program's results did not conclusively show that open
courtrooms had either a positive or a negative effect on dependency
proceedings, the pilot program was subsequently adopted
statewide.'29 Like Minnesota, Arizona has since kept its courts open
to the press and public.3
The most recent state to test whether it should transition to
open juvenile dependency proceedings through a pilot program was
Connecticut."' In February 2010, the State of Connecticut initiated
the Connecticut Juvenile Access Pilot Program, which was overseen
by an internal Advisory Board.3 2 After a year of studying its own
program as well as the open-court systems of other states (focusing
most closely on Minnesota and New York), the Advisory Board
http://www.azcourts.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=MIqR1UH59Q4%3D&tab
id=2023 (submitted to the Arizona Department of Economic
Security/Division of Children, Youth and Families, and the Administrative
Office of the Courts).
126. Maricopa County is the fourth largest county in the United States
with a population nearing four million. 100 Largest Counties, UNITED STATES
CENSUS BUREAU (July 1, 2011),
http://www.census.gov/popest/data/counties/totals/2011/
index.html.
127. ABATE, supra note 120, at 18.
128. Id. (quoting GREGORY BROBERG & VERA LOPEZ, ARIZONA OPEN
DEPENDENCY HEARING PILOT STUDY: FINAL REPORT 16 (2006), available at
http://www.azcourts.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=MlqR1UH59Q4 %3D&tab
id=2023 (submitted to the Arizona Department of Economic
Security/Division of Children, Youth and Families, and the Administrative
Office of the Courts)).
129. Id.
130. KAPALKO, supra note 124, at 23. See also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
8-525 (2012).
131. ABATE, supra note 120, at 22.
132. Id.
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decided to end the program.' The Board stated that: "Recognizing
that there is some benefit to limited expanded access, the Board
recommends amending the statute to permit the court to grant
access to individuals or entities with an established legitimate
interest in the proceedings." 34 The Board then concluded that: "A
legitimate interest rule will provide for the best expression of
responsible access which balances both sides of the public access
debate."3 s Since the conclusion of the pilot program, the plain
language of the most recent Connecticut statute addressing juvenile
court matters expresses that juvenile hearings are presumptively
open, but the judge may elect to exclude any person whose
presence is not necessary.136
Currently, according to a 2012 report published by
Fostering Media Connections, an organization dedicated to
harnessing the power of journalism to improve the well-being of
children that has extensively studied the debate over open juvenile
proceedings, there are twenty-four states with "presumptively
open" juvenile dependency courts 37 and twenty-seven states plus
133. JUVENILE ACCESS PILOT PROGRAM ADVISORY BOARD, REPORT TO
THE CONNECTICUT GENERAL ASSEMBLY 13-15, 28 (2010), available at
http://www.jud.ct.gov/committees/juv access/Final-report_123010.pdf.
134. Id. at 28.
135. Id. at 30.
136. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-122(c) (2012). The statute provides that
"any judge hearing a juvenile matter may, during such hearing, exclude from
the room in which such hearing is held any person whose presence is, in the
court's opinion, not necessary....§ § 46b-122(b). Furthermore, "[a]ny judge
hearing a juvenile matter, in which a child is alleged to be uncared for,
neglected, abused or dependent or in which a child is the subject of a petition
for termination of parental rights, may permit any person whom the court
finds has a legitimate interest in the hearing or the work of the court to attend
such hearing," and that "[sluch person may include . . . a representative of the
news media." § 46b-122(c).
137. KAPALKO, supra note 124, at 4, 23-27. "Presumptively open" means
that the court permits the press to attend by default, but the judge has the
discretion to close hearings when she sees fit, particularly when doing so is in
the child's best interests. Id. Today, the twenty-four presumptively open states
are: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Texas,
Utah, and Washington. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 47.10.070 (West 2012); ARIZ.
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the District of Columbia'. with "presumptively closed" "9 juvenile
dependency courts.'4 Nevada is included in both groups because in
REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-525 (2012); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-1-106(2) (West
2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-122(c) (West 2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
39.507(2) (West 2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-78 (West 2012); 705 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 405/1-5(7) (West 2012); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-32-6-2 (West
2012); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.92 (West 2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2247
(West 2012); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-810(b) (West 2012);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.17(7) (West 2012); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
260C.163(1)(c) (West 2012); NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-1001 (2012); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 432B.430(1); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.43(b) (West 2012); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-20 (West 2012); N.Y. R. CT. § 205.4 (West 2012); N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-801 (West 2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2151.35(A)(1) (West 2012); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 419B.310 (West 2012);
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 105.003(b) (West 2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-
114(1)(a) (West 2012); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.34.115 (West 2012).
138. See Srinivasa, supra note 33, at 100 (arguing that there are
compelling reasons why the District of Columbia should follow the example of
the presumptively open states and allow the general public to access
dependency court proceedings). See also D.C. CODE § 16-2316(e)(2) (2012)
(The District of Columbia statute addressing proceedings regarding
delinquency, neglect, or need of supervision states that: "Except in hearings to
declare an adult in contempt of court, the general public shall be excluded
from hearings arising under this subchapter.").
139. KAPALKO, supra note 124, at 3. "Presumptively closed" means that
journalists may not have access to hearings by default, and if journalists want
to attend, they have the burden of proving to the court that they should be
granted access. Id. Today, the twenty-seven presumptively closed states are:
Alabama, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada,
New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See ALA. CODE § 12-15-129 (2012); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 9-27-325(i)(1) (West 2012); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 346 (West
2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1063 (West 2012); HAw. REV. STAT. § 571-
41(b) (West 2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1613 (West 2012); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 610.070(3) (West 2012); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 407 (2012); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4007(1) (2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 65
(West 2012); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-203(6) (West 2012); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
211.171(6) (West 2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-205 (2012); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 432B.430(2) (West 2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:14
(2012); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-24(5) (West 2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
10A, § 1-4-503(A)(1) (West 2012); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6336 (West
2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 14-1-30 (West 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-3-
2013] STRIKING A BALANCE 513
that state, the openness of a dependency proceeding is contingent
upon the population of the judicial district where the case is being
heard, such that some counties have presumptively open courts
while others have presumptively closed courts.141
590 (2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-7A-36 (2012); TENN. R. Juv. PROC. art.
III, Rule 27 (2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5510 (West 2012); VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-302(C) (West 2012); W. VA. R. PROC. FOR CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLECT PROCEEDINGS 6A (2012); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.299 (West 2012);
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-424(b) (West 2012).
140. Hawaii's law provides a good example of what a presumptively
closed state statute looks like. The Hawaii statute provides that in proceedings
for children's cases:
[T]he general public shall be excluded and only such
persons admitted whose presence is requested by the
parent or guardian or as the judge or district family judge
finds to have a direct interest in the case, from the
standpoint of the best interests of the child involved, or in
the work of the court.
HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-41(b) (2012).
A more restrictive example of a presumptively closed state statute is that
of Maine, which only allows a proceeding to be open if there is a court order
granting public access. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 4007 (2012). The statute states
that: "All child protection proceedings shall be conducted according to the
rules of civil procedure and the rules of evidence, except as provided
otherwise in this chapter. All the proceedings shall be recorded. All
proceedings and records shall be closed to the public, unless the court orders
otherwise." Id.
1.41. Subsection (1) of the Nevada statute pronounces a presumption of
open dependency proceedings, providing:
in each judicial district that includes a county whose
population is 700,000 or more . . . [a]ny proceeding ...
must be open to the general public unless the judge or
master, upon his or her own motion or upon the motion of
another person, determines that all or part of the
proceeding must be closed to the general public because
such closure is in the best interests of the child who is the
subject of the proceeding.
NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 432B.430(1) (West 2012). However, subsection (2) of
the statute enunciates a presumption of closed dependency proceedings,
providing:
in each judicial district that includes a county whose
population is less than 700,000 . .. [a]ny proceeding ...
must be closed to the general public unless the judge or
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Collectively, the case law, legislation, and pilot studies
described above illustrate that press access to juvenile dependency
proceedings has gradually increased over the past several years.
This trend is encouraging, but until all states adopt a presumptively
open approach to these proceedings, members of the press will
continue to be denied one of the central guarantees of the First
Amendment.142 Over the past few years, the debate over public
access to dependency hearings has quieted; however, earlier this
year, it resurged again in a state that has seen efforts to open its
dependency courts for over a decade.
III. THE STATE OF THE MATTER IN CALIFORNIA 43
In contrast to most states, which have general statutes that
address court access, California has its own Rules of Court that
apply to juvenile court proceedings and specifically govern who can
and cannot be present during juvenile dependency and delinquency
master, upon his or her own motion or upon the motion of
another person, determines that all or part of the
proceeding must be open to the general public because
opening the proceeding in such a manner is in the best
interests of the child who is the subject of the proceeding.
Id. § 432B.430(2).
142. U.S. CONsT. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.")
(emphasis added).
143. This Note focuses more closely on California because Los Angeles
County, the largest county in the state and more notably, in the nation, is the
most recent jurisdiction to adopt a presumption of openness in its juvenile
dependency courts. Early last year, a prominent juvenile court judge in Los
Angeles County ordered that the county's dependency courts transition from
presumptively closed to presumptively open. This decision was met with both
considerable support and considerable opposition. See infra Part III.B; see also
100 Largest Counties, U.S. CENSUs BUREAU (July 1, 2011),
http://www.census.gov/popest/data/counties/totals/
2011/index.html.
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hearings.1 Those who can be present under the Rules include: (1)
the child; (2) the parents or guardians; (3) the attorney representing
the child, parent, or guardian; (4) the probation officer or social
worker; (5) the prosecuting attorney; (6) any Court Appointed
Special Advocate (CASA) volunteer; (7) a representative of the
Indian children's tribe; (8) the court clerk; (9) the official court
reporter; (10) a bailiff, if needed; and (11) any other persons
entitled to notice of the hearing.1 45 Furthermore, the Rules
explicitly state that the public cannot be admitted to a juvenile
court proceeding unless the court deems that a person has "a direct
and legitimate interest in the case or in the work of the court."'4
Given the restrictive nature of these rules, multiple efforts have
been mounted to change California's laws regarding public access
to juvenile proceedings.' As will be outlined in the following
144. Flint, supra note 21, at 68-69 (citing CAL. RULES OF COURT R.
5.530).
145. CAL. RULES OF COURT R. 5.530(b).
146. CAL. RULES OF COURT R. 5.530(e). This same qualification is
enunciated in California's Welfare and Institutions Code, which provides:
Unless requested by a parent or guardian and consented
to or requested by the minor concerning whom the
petition has been filed, the public shall not be admitted to
a juvenile court hearing. The judge or referee may
nevertheless admit such persons as he deems to have a
direct and legitimate interest in the particular case or the
work of the court.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 346 (West 2012). The state statute and court rules
make it clear that California is characterized as a presumptively closed state.
147. One metaphor helps to explain the trouble with California's juvenile
court access laws:
If you walked into class on the first day of law school
wearing a suit while all the other students were in jeans,
you would get noticed. The other students may act quickly
to change you by telling you the importance of fitting in
with the rest of the law school crowd. California is the kid
in the suit. California's dependency court access laws
differ from other states so they get noticed. Due to the
fact that California courts and legislators decided to limit
access to juvenile courts, legislators have rushed to tell
them how to improve and how to fit in well with the rest
of the crowd.
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section, the two major legislative bodies in the state took action to
"open[ ] the doors to California's juvenile dependency courts" in a
manner that allowed the press and public greater access but also
protected the confidentiality of the children involved in the
.148proceedings.
A. Two Main Pieces of Attempted Legislation
In 2000, two members of the California Senate proposed
California Senate Bill 1391, seeking to make all juvenile
dependency proceedings presumptively open to the public.149
Though the bill passed in the state senate, it was not approved by
the state assembly,'5 (o largely due to opposition from children's
rights groups and social workers."' Four years later, a member of
the California Assembly proposed California Assembly Bill 2627.152
Like Senate Bill 1391, Assembly Bill 2627 pushed for presumptively
open juvenile dependency proceedings."" But unlike the earlier bill,
this bill recommended a pilot program to test the effectiveness of
114
open hearings. Again, though, this bill did not survive both the
assembly committee and the senate committee.'5 ' To this day,
juvenile dependency courtrooms in California remain
presumptively closed to the public, unless the child or the child's
parent requests otherwise or the judge finds it necessary to admit
Flint, supra note 21, at 70.
148. Id. at 70-73.
149. Id. at 70-71 (citing S.B. 1391, 2000 Sess. (Cal. 2000)).
150. The California legislature is divided into two legislative bodies: the
State Assembly and the State Senate. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1. All legislative
power in the state is vested in these two bodies. Id. The Assembly is
comprised of eighty members, and the Senate is comprised of forty members.
Id. art. IV, § 6. Each member represents a different legislative district in
California. Id.
151. Flint, supra note 21, at 71-72 (noting that those groups thought that
the bill would not adequately protect the children involved in dependency
proceedings).
152. Id. at 72 (citing A.B. 2627, 2004 Sess. (Cal. 2004)).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 73.
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certain individuals.'-6 However, in early 2012, Los Angeles County's
dependency hearings were opened to the press, marking a
significant step towards opening all dependency courts throughout
California.'
B. Momentous Change for Los Angeles County
In February 2012, Judge Michael Nash, the longest serving
Juvenile Court judge in the State of California, effectively opened
juvenile dependency proceedings in Los Angeles County to the
public."' Judge Nash ordered that "[m]embers of the press shall be
allowed access to Juvenile Dependency Court hearings unless there
is a reasonable likelihood that such access will be harmful to the
child's or children's best interests."'" The order went into effect
immediately, and subsequently, reporters began attending
hearings. 60 Judge Nash's decision was quickly confronted with
opposition from attorneys, social workers, elected officials, and
others.1' These opponents argued that "the order overreaches and
intrudes on the privacy of children who have already suffered
mistreatment." 62 Just one week after the courts were opened, the
Children's Law Center of California, a public firm which represents
the majority of children in the system, filed a lawsuit, arguing that
156. See CAL. WELF. & INST. § 346 (West 2012).
157. See Rachel M. Zahorsky, LA Judge Orders Greater Media Access to
Juvenile Court, ABA JOURNAL (Feb. 2, 2012),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/l.a.-judge-.orders.greater-media-acce
ss-to-juvenilecourt/.
158. See id.
159. Blanket Order Re: WIC 346 and Public and Media Attendance at
Dependency Court Hearing, Super. Ct. of Cal., Cnty. of L.A. (Jan. 31, 2012),
at 4.
160. See KAPALKO, supra note 124, at 6 (citing Garrett Therolf & John
Hoeffel, Media Gain Access to L.A. County Children's Courts, L. A. TIMES
(Feb. 7, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/febl07/local/la-me-open-child-
court-20120207).
161. Garrett Therolf & John Hoeffel, Media Gain Access to L.A. County
Children's Courts, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2012,
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/07/
locallia-me-open-child-court-20120207.
162. Id.
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Nash's order violates state law and seeking that the order be
overturned. On February 15, 2012, the California Court of
Appeals denied the Children's Law Center's petition to overturn
Judge Nash's order.6
Since Judge Nash's ruling went into effect, dependency
proceedings in Los Angeles County have remained open to the
press, a positive sign for supporters of open courts.16 Despite the
most recent transition from closed to open courtrooms in Los
Angeles County and the growing number of presumptively open
states and jurisdictions, the debate still continues as professionals
with significant roles in dependency proceedings, legal scholars,
members of the press, and concerned citizens weigh in on whether
courts should be open not just in Los Angeles County, but
nationwide.
IV. THE COMPETING INTERESTS AT PLAY
The debate over open juvenile dependency proceedings is
an important matter impacting many facets of the juvenile court
116
system. As briefly mentioned before, the two competing interests
at the center of the debate are the privacy rights of children
involved in dependency proceedings and the First Amendment
rights of the press to access those proceedings. 6 1 States, under their
163. See id.; KAPALKO, supra note 124, at 6 (noting that the Center "filed
a writ [with the California Court of Appeals] seeking a stay of the order on the
grounds that Judge Nash exceeded his authority in issuing it").
164. Children's Law Ctr. of Cal. v. Super. Ct. of L.A. Cnty., No. B238899
(Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2012).
165. Heimpel, supra note 8, at 3 (remarking that "Judge Michael Nash
famously opened juvenile dependency hearings in Los Angeles County earlier
this year").
166. See generally KAPALKO, supra note 124 (presenting the main
reasons asserted in support of and in opposition to presumptively open
dependency courtrooms).
167. Compare Flint, supra note 21, at 81 ("Though closed courtroom
policies leave the public and the media out in the cold, they are beneficial in
that they maintain a protective watch over the children and their emotional
needs. In states that have closed court policies, child victims of abuse and
neglect can take comfort in the fact that their stories will not be broadcast
before the world."), with Sokol, supra note 47 (arguing that "statutes
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traditional parens patriae authority, have a legitimate interest in
protecting the children affected in dependency proceedings because
these children are the victims of abuse or neglect whose parents or
guardians have allegedly failed them. 6 8 Typically, the nature of
dependency cases is quite sensitive, and it may be necessary only to
allow persons intricately involved in the cases into the courtroom.169
Nevertheless, states also have a legitimate interest in preserving the
First Amendment right of freedom of the press, and by prohibiting
press access to juvenile dependency proceedings, courts may be
infringing upon this long-recognized fundamental right.o In order
to adequately defend this latter position, it is beneficial to examine
the opposing position first.
A. Arguments in Favor of Closed Dependency Proceedings
Although the number of states with presumptively open
juvenile dependency courts is steadily rising, many states still have
presumptively closed juvenile dependency courts,"' and there are
several valid reasons for keeping the courts closed from the press
and the public.
1. Protecting the Privacy Interests of the Child
The primary reason for maintaining closed dependency
courtrooms is to protect the privacy interests of the children
mandating closure of dependency court proceedings violate the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution").
168. Flint, supra note 21, at 81 (commenting that "[t]hese children are in
dependency court because their caretakers have failed them and they need the
protection of the state"); Ventrell, supra note 19, at 31 (noting that "parens
patriae continues as the underlying authority for intervention").
169. Flint, supra note 21, at 78-80 (arguing that allowing the press and
the public into dependency courtrooms will only serve to intensify the harm
that these children have already suffered).
170. As aforementioned, for many years, the Supreme Court and several
federal courts have recognized the First Amendment right of the press and
public to attend adult criminal and civil proceedings. See supra Part II.B.1.
171. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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involved in the cases.172 The concern is that press access to the
courtroom will place the privacy of children at risk by allowing
members of the press to observe and report on some of the most
173difficult, intimate details of their lives. One critic of open
proceedings states that "[a]lthough a substantial percentage of the
contemporary press still views its role as the traditional educator
and protector of the public, one must consider the lowest common
denominator when determining the risk that less scrupulous
journalists will unreasonably violate the privacy interests of families
in the dependency system."1 74
Some courts have agreed with this view, finding that the
privacy interests of the child outweighed any interests the press may
have in attending particular court proceedings.7 In the case Ex rel
M.B.,'7 6 PG Publishing Company ("PG Publishing") appealed an
order of the lower court denying the press access to the juvenile
dependency proceedings of M.B. and J.B., siblings who were
removed from their parents' custody after the murder of their eight-
year-old sister.177 The murder of their sister gained immediate
publicity, and for months, local news outlets published numerous
stories about her homicide and the parents' struggle in family court
to regain custody of M.B. and J.B."7 Given all of the press attention
that this case had already received, the Pennsylvania Superior
Court agreed with the trial court's finding that in this particular
172. Andrea Poe, Foster Care: Why the Debate Over Open Courts
Matters, THE WASHINGTON TIMES (Sept. 4, 2012)
http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/red-thread-adoptive-
family-forum/2012/sep/4/foster-care-why-debate-over-open-courts-matters/.
173. Id. (pointing out that presumptively open dependency hearings,
particularly those involving incidents of abuse, can expose the most personal
and humiliating details of the children's lives to the public).
174. William Wesley Patton, Pandora's Box: Opening Child Protection
Cases to the Press and Public, 27 W. ST. U. L. REv. 181, 187 (2000).
175. See Natural Parents of J.B. v. Fla. Dep't of Children & Family
Servs., 780 So.2d 6, 11 (Fla. 2001); Ex rel M.B., 819 A.2d 59, 60 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2003).
176. 819 A.2d 59 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
177. Id. at 60.
178. Id. at 60-61 ("In many of these reports, the children's names were
used.").
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case, "there is no less restrictive means to serve the compelling
interest in protecting the children's privacy rights than total closure
of the proceedings. "'8o
Similarly, in Natural Parents of J.B. v. Florida Department
of Children & Family Services,' the Supreme Court of Florida held
that closure of a termination of parental rights (TPR) proceeding
was necessary to protect the privacy of the child involved.'" After
J.B. a minor child, was found to be dependent due to her parents'
inability to care for her, the Department of Children and Family
Services moved to permanently terminate parental rights, at which
point Florida law mandated that dependency hearings become
closed to the public. 83 The parents argued that this mandatory
closure provision in the statute was unconstitutional, and instead,
TPR proceedings should be presumptively open.'1 However, the
179. In a more recent Pennsylvania Superior Court case that involved
juvenile delinquency proceedings rather than juvenile dependency
proceedings, the court addressed "[w]hether this Court's finding in In re M.B.
created a brightline distinction between juvenile dependency and juvenile
delinquency proceedings as to the right of members of the media to access
juvenile delinquency proceedings." In re J.B., 39 A.3d 421, 425-26 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2012) (citation omitted). The court determined that In re M.B. did not
create "any 'brightline' distinction between the privacy interests of a juvenile
in a dependency proceeding and a juvenile in a delinquency proceeding." Id.
at 429. The court followed the test employed in In re M.B. that there is a
constitutional presumption of openness, but if a party seeks to keep the
proceedings closed that party "may rebut the presumption of openness by
demonstrating that: (1) the denial of public access serves an important
governmental interest, and (2) no less restrictive means to serve that interest
exists" Id. at 430 (citing In re M.B., 819 A.2d at 63). Applying this test, the
court found that "the denial of public access to the juvenile proceedings at
hands serves an important governmental interest," specifically the "compelling
state interest in protecting the privacy of juveniles." Id. at 432.
180. In re M.B., 819 A.2d at 65.
181. 780 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 2001).
182. Id. at 12. Relying on precedent, the court stated that: "We held that
the best interest of the child and the public policy of protecting the parties'
privacy in adoption proceedings outweighed the interest the public might have
in having access to the proceedings." Id. at 10-11. The court went on to apply
this same reasoning to TPR proceedings. Id. at 10-12 (citing In re Adoption of
H.Y.T., 458 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 1984)).
183. Id. at 7-8 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.467 (1997)).
184. Id. at 8, 11.
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court rejected this argument, reasoning that in TPR proceedings,
the "paramount concern of the Court and the Legislature is the
health and safety of the child or children involved," and "[b]ecause
of this overriding concern, the mandatory closure of certain
proceedings involving children is not an unconstitutional limitation
on First Amendment freedoms.",8 1
Opponents of open proceedings express a distrust of the
press that is not entirely unfounded, as they feel some media outlets
have overstepped ethical boundaries by reporting on information
obtained from the dependency courtroom that runs contrary to the
best interests of the child the court seeks to guard.'86 Though these
incidents have occurred infrequently,' the presence of the media
in the courtroom raises the possibility that confidential information
could be released to the public, resulting in harm to the children
involved in the case.8
185. Id. at 11.
186. See, e.g., Heimpel, supra note 8, at 2.
187. See, e.g., In re "S" Children, 532 N.Y.S.2d 192 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1988).
In the case of In re "S" Children, the court invited The Times Herald Record
("the Record"), a local media outlet, to present arguments at a child
dependency proceeding as to whether the press "should be conditionally
allowed to cover these 'closed' proceedings." Id. at 193. At the end of the
hearing, the court instructed the Record that it would not reach a final
decision on press access until the parties submitted legal briefs and further
ordered that the Record not publish any of the facts of the legal arguments for
at least twenty-two hours to protect confidential information pertaining to the
children involved in the case. Id. However, the very next morning, the Record
printed a story about the case, which the court determined to be a direct
violation of its order. Id.
188. One journalist and social work student considered the impact of
press access on "the actual court participants: the youth" by asking a group of
teenagers in foster care how they felt about the idea of reporters in the
courtroom. Anna Jacobi, Journalist vs. Social Worker: My Internal Conflict
About Access to Dependency Court Proceedings, THE CHRONICLE OF SOCIAL
CHANGE (July 16, 2012),
http://chronicleofsocialchange.wordpress.com/2012/07/16/journalist-vs-social-
worker-dependency-court-proceedings/. One teen, representing the consensus
of the group, replied: "My business out there for everyone? You crazy!" Id.
The teens went on to explain that "their 'business' is already public enough
without needing any reporter to make it more so." Id.
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The central focus of juvenile dependency proceedings is to
preserve the best interests of the children involved and achieve an
outcome that satisfies those interests.8 One legal scholar argues
that there is a "mantra" often asserted in support of closed
proceedings that "the interests of the juvenile . . . are most often
best served by anonymity and confidentiality."'9 The children in
these proceedings have legitimate privacy interests in keeping the
intimate details of their familial relationships free from outside
eyes, and allowing the press and public into the courtroom could
invade these privacy interests.'9' In some instances, protecting the
privacy of the children involved in these proceedings is in their best
interests. '9 When this is the case, courts, in safeguarding the best
interests of the children, may be required to exclude the press and
the public from dependency hearings to assure that all information
exchanged in the courtroom is kept confidential. 19 3
2. Detrimental to the Child's Mental Health
Another related argument against open juvenile
dependency proceedings is that not only could press access
negatively impact the children's privacy interests, but also their
psychological well-being. 94 Some dependency cases involve severe
instances of sexual abuse, such as rape. The child victims may be
ashamed of the trauma they have suffered, and opponents of open
189. Ventrell, supra note 19, at 31 ("The best interests standard is the
governing principle of the modern dependency court.").
190. See Bean, supra note 20, at 59 (quoting Edward A. Sherman Publ'g
Co. v. Goldberg, 443 A.2d 1252, 1258 (R.I. 1982)).
191. Id. at 3 ("[W]hen the issue is neglect or abuse, it is hard to deny the
appeal of protecting a child from the public gaze.").
192. Flint, supra note 21, at 74-75 (asserting that "the rights of the child
victims are often forgotten in the rush to open courtroom doors" and urging
that states consider these rights before they allow open dependency
courtrooms).
193. Id. at 78.
194. See id. at 78-79 ("[Tlhe child may suffer psychological harm merely
by having his or her story shared in public."); see also Patton, supra note 174,
at 195 ("[T]he likelihood and severity of emotional injury to the child abuse
victim who is exposed to the public and peers is great.").
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dependency courts argue that openness would expose the abuse
suffered by the children to their peers and the public, further
embarrassing the children.'9' The concern is that this public
disclosure would impede the children in their recovery from the
emotional injuries they suffered, which could detrimentally affect
their social development and their ability to cope with challenging
situations in the future.'9
3. Negative Influence on the Child's Courtroom Participation
Additionally, critics of open hearings contend that media
presence may affect the children's participation in the
proceedings.' 7 The press and the public are strangers to these
children, and when children have to testify about highly personal
and often embarrassing matters, the prospect of doing so in front of
total strangers can be daunting.'98 As one commentator argues,
when children have to testify with the press in attendance, it is
highly possible that the child will either refuse to cooperate in the
proceeding by not testifying at all, or the child will repudiate his or
her account of the events that led to the proceeding.'" The concern
is that if a child is too afraid to cooperate, "the court will not have
sufficient evidence for detainment and may be forced to send the
child back to the abusive environment. 2 0
Many of these arguments in favor of maintaining closed
dependency proceedings, while understandable, are grounded in a
195. See Flint, supra note 21, at 79.
196. See id. ("This sense of shame and possible taunting by peers may
have a downward spiral effect causing the child's academic performance to
suffer and his or her social development to be stifled."); see also Patton, supra
note 174, at 195 ("[Cjhild victims may find peer reaction to the assault one of
the greatest impediments to their recovery." (citing Charles R. Petrof,
Protecting The Anonymity of Child Sexual Assault Victims, 40 WAYNE L. REV.
1677, 1688 (1994))).
197. See Flint, supra note 21, at 78.
198. See id.
199. Id. ("Children may be intimidated by the public or media presence
in the courtroom and may refuse to cooperate in the proceedings and the
investigation into the alleged abuse.").
200. Id.
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mistrust of the press.201 Furthermore, they disregard the capabilities
of all of the other essential people who are always permitted in the
courtroom to look out for the best interests of the children,
including judges, social workers, guardian ad litem attorneys, and
family members who are present to support the children.20 While
the arguments for presumptively closed proceedings are legitimate,
they are not as thoroughly supported as those for presumptively
open proceedings.
B. Arguments in Favor of Open Dependency Proceedings
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states
"Congress shall make no law . .. abridging the freedom . . . of the
press. 203 The Supreme Court has never specifically addressed
whether this right includes access to juvenile dependency
proceedings. 2 4 The Court has, however, upheld the First
Amendment right of the public to attend adult criminal
proceedings.2 05 In following the Court's reasons for preserving this
right of access, there is a strong argument for why this right should
also extend to juvenile proceedings. 206 The premise is that closed
juvenile dependency court proceedings, like closed adult criminal
proceedings, generally violate the First Amendment. 207 Therefore,
under the First Amendment, "the public and its surrogate, the
press, [should] have a constitutional right to attend dependency
court proceedings." 208 Thus under the test developed by the Court
in Globe, "any party seeking to close such a proceeding must bear
201. Heimpel, supra note 8, at 2 (pointing out that those in favor of
closed courtrooms are guided by "fear and mistrust" of the news media).
202. Flint, supra note 21, at 75 (admitting that the child welfare system is
in need of repair, but arguing that the problem is not the work ethic of the
judges, attorneys, social workers, and others involved, but rather the system's
lack of resources).
203. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
204. See supra Part II.A.
205. See supra Part.II.B.1 (discussing the Supreme Court's holdings in
Richmond Newspapers and Globe).
206. See generally Sokol, supra note 47.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 883.
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the burden of demonstrating that closure is 'necessitated by a
compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve
that interest."' 209
A significant argument raised in support of open
dependency proceedings is centered on increasing the level of
transparency in the courtroom, which can only be achieved by
permitting the press to exercise its First Amendment right to attend
such proceedings. 21 0 The argument is essentially that "transparency
leads to better decisions by putting a spotlight on judges, exposes
the blunders of child welfare workers and gives the public a better
understanding of how the system works." 2 11
1. Accountability
One of the primary benefits of transparency in dependency
proceedings is that it increases accountability in the courtroom.212
Dependency court judges are responsible for answering questions
that will change the lives of the children involved in the
proceedings, such as: should the children be reunited with their
parents, should the parents' parental rights be terminated, or
should the children be adopted?213 Social workers, attorneys,
guardians ad litem, court-appointed special advocates, and others
are essential in helping judges answer these vital questions.21 4 Both
separately and collaboratively, judges, social workers, attorneys,
advocates, and other court officials have significant professional
responsibilities in dependency hearings. To achieve the most
209. Id. (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 607
(1982)).
210. See Bean, supra note 20, at 51-52; Sokol, supra note 47, at 913;
Srinivasa, supra note 33, at 83-84.
211. Are Foster Kids Helped, Harmed by Open Hearings, FOxNEWS
(May 28, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/05/28/are-foster-kids-helped-
harmed-by-open-hearings/.
212. See Srinivasa, supra note 33, at 86-90.
213. Id. at 87 (highlighting that federal legislation has largely expanded
the juvenile dependency judge's role, allowing the judge "to determine what
support services a family needs and if a child can remain at home").
214. See Hatcher, Mason & Rubin, supra note 38, at 23.
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desirable results for the children involved in these cases, they all
must work diligently to fulfill their duties.215
One scholar asserts that openness "promotes more
accountability and combats any appearance of bias or abuse of
power by the judges and attorneys in the courtroom."2 16 As such, it
creates a "checks-and-balances" type of system,217 which has been
considered a significant justification for open courts in adult
218
criminal proceedings for decades. With so much at stake in
dependency proceedings, it is critical to ensure that judges, social
workers, court-appointed advocates, and all those closely involved
in the dependency court system are performing their jobs with the
intention of achieving the best possible outcomes for the children.
219
2. Proper Practice
In addition to holding court authorities accountable, open
courts also work to improve the functionality of the dependency
court process.220 Traditionally, dependency court proceedings are
more informal than other court proceedings in order to minimize
215. Id. at 23-26 (explaining the different roles of all of the "players"
involved in the juvenile dependency system).
216. Srinivasa, supra note 33, at 83-84.
217. Id. at 84 ("The 'checks-and-balances' philosophy behind open courts
fits with the democratic principles of due process and transparency in
government systems.") (citation omitted).
218. As Veena Srinivasa points out, in his majority opinion in Press-
Enterprise 1, Chief Justice Warren Burger noted that "the 'value of openness
lies in the fact that people not actually attending trials can have confidence
that standards of fairness are being observed; the sure knowledge that anyone
is free to attend gives assurance that established procedures are being
followed and that deviations will become known."' Id. at 84 (quoting Press-
Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984) (emphasis in
original).
219. Bean, supra note 20, at 54 ("Because dependency courts are charged
with making major decisions about children's lives, the potential for misuse of
power is great.").
220. See id. at 52-53; see also Sokol supra note 47, at 912; Srinivasa, supra
note 33, at 86.
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the adversarial environment of the typical courtroom.221 But some
argue that a lack of formality may actually create more problems
than it prevents, and proponents of open courtrooms suggest that
allowing press and public access to courtrooms may lead to a more
222
appropriate, formal process. Sometimes informality can lead to
procedural errors that would otherwise be avoided in a more formal
223
environment. Just as open courtrooms may help to ensure that
judges, social workers, attorneys, and others who play a role in
dependency proceedings are fulfilling their professional and ethical
obligations in the courtroom, open courtrooms may also prompt
more procedural caution to be taken to ensure greater accuracy and
224
consistency in the courtroom.
3. Public Awareness and Reform
A final argument frequently emphasized in support of open
221dependency proceedings focuses on educating the public. Public
scrutiny can trigger reform when the social welfare system is
221. Srinivasa, supra note 33, at 86.
222. Bean, supra note 20, at 53 ("While informality was central to the
original vision of juvenile court, and while both familiarity and informality can
and likely do contribute to some beneficial outcomes in dependency court, an
open courtroom can provide a check to their possible negative effects.");
Sokol, supra note 47, at 918 ("Public access would heighten procedural
regularity in dependency cases, just as it currently does in criminal and other
civil cases."); Srinivasa, supra note 33, at 86-87 ("Presumptively closed
dependency courts reinforce the 'clubby' atmosphere and informality of the
court, where the judges, lawyers and social workers are all repeat players in
the courtroom process . . . . [Contrary to traditional beliefs,] countervailing
evidence supports the conclusion that formal proceedings produce more
accurate fact-finding and decision-making.") (citation omitted).
223. Bean, supra note 20, at 53 (arguing that dependency proceedings
should more closely mirror those of trial proceedings since the "'formal rules
that govern trial procedure also help to assure accuracy."' (quoting Amy
Sinden, "Why Won't Mom Cooperate?": A Critique of Informality in Child
Welfare Proceedings, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM, 339, 379-80 (1999))).
224. Id. ("[Olpenness should operate to minimize procedural errors.");
Sokol, supra note 47, at 915 ("While public access would only moderately
enhance dependency court fact finding, it would significantly enhance
dependency court procedure.").
225. See Bean, supra note 20, at 55-56.
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failing.226 When courtrooms are closed, the public is entirely
unaware of any problems that occur due to power discrepancies,
overworked and underpaid social welfare workers, procedural
227errors, or other issues. Unfortunately, the individuals harmed the
most by these shortcomings are the children the dependency court
228is supposed to protect. Often though, these consequences could
be prevented or at least alleviated through public action, but this is
221impossible unless the public knows what is happening. Under the
ambit of the First Amendment, the press can, and should, have
access to dependency proceedings in order to "educate the public
about the norms of the child welfare system," which can, in turn,
"empower public advocacy for appropriate reforms.",23 0
Over the past few years, reporters in presumptively closed
states have negotiated their way into dependency court hearings,
and what they discovered was shocking.23 1 In the fall of 2005, the
226. Id.
227. See id. at 56.
228. Id. at 58 (maintaining that "[p]ublic disclosure might assist in
drawing attention to the terrible plight of children in this country and to the
ever shrinking resources allocated to both them and the system which is
designed to protect them . . . . "(quoting James Brelsford & Roger Myers,
Juvenile Courts; Part II: The Value of Access, 12 COMM. LAW 14, 14 (1994))).
229. One scholar encompasses the essence of this argument:
Public action can occur if the public can see for itself the
inadequacies of the system, such as the need for better
facilities; the need for more staff, better trained staff,
better paid staff, and better qualified staff; the need for
daycare subsidies, more healthcare support, more home
support services, and better support for foster families;
and the overall need for substantially more financial
resources. The action may be as pointed and immediate as
voting a judge out of office or applying public pressure to
remove a lawyer from court appointments; it may be as
broad as demanding more funding to attract better
personnel, train better personnel, and retain better
personnel. But knowledge is the prerequisite to action,
and the public first needs access to the system.
Id. at 56.
230. Srinivasa, supra note 33, at 84.
231. See id. at 85 (citing Deborah Yetter, Special Report, Children in
Crisis, COURIER-JOURNAL.COM (Dec. 13-15, 2009)). See also Heimpel, supra
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San Francisco Chronicle agreed to collaborate with several child
advocacy groups in California as part of a year-long foster care
reform campaign.23 Pati Poblete, an editorial writer for the
Chronicle, gained access to dependency courtrooms throughout
California where she learned of the immense inadequacies in
California's foster care system?.3 Some of the deficiencies in the
system included inabilities to find permanent placements for
children, to assure that children are receiving an appropriate
education, to provide Supplemental Security Income for children
with disabilities, and to find long-term housing for children who will
soon be emancipated from the system.234
Based on Poblete's initial findings, the Chronicle editorial
board started reporting for the campaign, dedicating the first of
many articles on California's foster care system to recounting the
troubling story of one teenage girl Poblete met in a California
dependency courtroom. The girl had been in the system since she
was thirteen years old and, in the four years since she entered the
system, she had been shuffled through several group homes where
she frequently lived in substandard conditions and was the victim of
236physical abuse. The girl described how she had no one to rely
on - "[n]ot the social workers, who would only appear when it was
time to move her again, then never return her calls;" "[njot the
attorney, who was supposed to represent her, but whom she never
even met;" "[njot her mother or her father;" "not the state or the
note 8 (referring to editorials written by two California reporters, Karen de Sa
of the San Jose Mercury News and Pati Poblete of the San Francisco
Chronicle).
232. Tracy Schroth, Creating a Climate for Reform: Working with the
Media to Improve Foster Care in California, 28 JOURNAL NAT'L CTR. FOR
YOUTH LAW 9, 11 (Jan.-Mar. 2007).
233. Heimpel, supra note 8.
234. Editorial, First Steps on Foster Care, S.F. CHRONICLE (Sept. 14,
2005), http://www.sfgate.comlopinion/editorials/article/First-steps-on-foster-
care-2577701.php.
235. See Editorial, No Refuge: How California is Failing its Foster
Children, S.F. CHRONICLE (Sept. 11, 2005, 4:00 AM),
http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/article/
NO-REFUGE-How-California-is-failing-its-foster-2577887.php.
236. Id.
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county, both of which became her official guardians once she was
brought into the foster-care system."m As the Chronicle reported,
she was yet another child in California's foster care system who
"fell through the cracks." 238
Since the publication of the first article, the Chronicle
published dozens more editorials, articles, and letters to the editor,
exposing the major shortcomings in the California social welfare
system.239 At the end of many of its pieces, the Chronicle avowed:
"[w]e will continue to pursue this issue until the state of California
reforms its foster-care system to ensure that it can provide more
resources and more consistent care for the 80,000 children whose
biological parents are unwilling or unable to assume the
responsibility." 2 40 Reforms emerged in response to these media
advocacy efforts, including the addition of almost $100 million to
the state's child welfare budget and the signing of eight bills by then
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger to ensure improvements in the
system.241 The actions of Poblete and the Chronicle editorial board
demonstrate how media access to juvenile dependency proceedings
can garner public attention, which can lead to much-needed reform.
Although the press frequently exposes the bad, it also
exposes the good; just as the public should be informed of the
negative aspects of juvenile dependency proceedings, it should also
have the opportunity to learn of the positive aspects. For instance,
Ryann Blackshere, a reporter who observed a presumptively closed
juvenile dependency court in San Mateo, California, learned from
one of the social workers in court that "while she doesn't want all of
her cases open to the media, she would like some cases covered so
that people have a better idea of the more positive things that
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. See Schroth, supra note 232, at 10.
240. Editorial, No Refuge: The Courts: Where will Our Children Land?
Inside the Courtroom: Decisions of a Lifetime, S. F. CHRONICLE, Dec. 4, 2005,
http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/editorials/article/NO-REFUGE-THE-
COURTS-Where-will-our-children-2590777.php#page-1.
241. See Schroth, supra note 232, at 10.
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happen within the court- like lives being repaired." 24 2 Sometimes,
juvenile dependency proceedings are the forum for happy endings,
especially when children are reunited with their now healthy and
responsible parents or when children are adopted by a loving
family. 243 There are many hard-working and passionate social
workers, attorneys, children's advocates, judges, and other court
officials who diligently strive to attain the best possible outcomes
for children who have been forced into dependency proceedings;
the public should be allowed to see this side of the system as well.24
V. ALLOWING OPEN COURTS WHILE APPEASING THE
ADVERSARIES
Based upon the First Amendment's guarantees, juvenile
dependency courtrooms, like adult criminal courtrooms, should be
presumptively open to the press and public. However, this access
should not be absolute and should adhere to the strict scrutiny
standard for adult criminal proceedings set forth by the Supreme
Court in Globe.245 That standard provides that access may be
denied if "the denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental
interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest." 246
In the context of juvenile dependency proceedings, one such
compelling governmental interest would be to protect the best
interests of the child.247 Therefore, for children who are mature
248
enough to express their own interests in court, the decision of
242. Ryann Blackshere, Covering Juvenile Dependency Courts:
Journalists' Responsibility, THE CHRONICLE OF SOCIAL CHANGE (July 12,
2012), http://chronicleofsocialchange.wordpress.com/2012/07/12/covering-juvenile-dependency-courts-journalists-responsibility/.
243. See Myers, supra note 36, at 462.
244. Id. at 463 ("The child protection system is far from perfect, and
much remains to be done, but, at the same time, much has been
accomplished.").
245. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982).
246. Id.
247. See KAPALKO, supra note 124, at 12-13.
248. In juvenile dependency proceedings, a determination as to when a
child is mature enough to make his or her own decisions regarding his or her
case depends upon the age of the child and the nature of the issues involved in
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open access should largely lie with them.249 In all other cases, this
decision should be at the discretion of the judge.250 The decision
involves a balancing test to be performed on a case-by-case basis,
between preserving the privacy rights and the emotional well-being
of the child and upholding the First Amendment rights of the press
and the public.
Although achieving this balance can be challenging, some
states have adopted laws that satisfy the competing interests in the
debate over press access to juvenile dependency hearings.251 North
Carolina is one such state.
the case. Often, the child's lawyer or guardian ad litem may decide that the
child is mature enough to express his or her own interests in court when he or
she is able to make reasonable decisions about the issues in question and is
able to logically communicate these decisions. See generally Giving the
Children a Meaningful Voice: The Role of the Child's Lawyer in Child
Protective, Permanency and Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings, THE
LEGAL AID SOCIETY (2008), available at http://www.legal-
aid.org/media/68451/role %200f%20jrp%201awyer%2010-08.pdf.
249. KAPALKO, supra note 124, at 13 ("The children in the child welfare
system ... should have the right to determine whether the media or any other
member of the public is allowed into the proceedings.").
250. Id. at 4 (explaining that presumptively open courts typically give the
judge the discretion to close dependency proceedings, if doing so is deemed to
be in the child's best interests) (citation omitted).
251. Other states that have laws very similar to that of North Carolina
include: Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, New York, and Utah. See id.
at 23-27 (noting the balanced approach of Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Iowa,
Kansas, New York, North Carolina, and Utah). See ALASKA STAT. ANN. §
47.10.070(a) (West 2012) ("Except as provided in (c) of this section, and unless
prohibited by federal or state law, court order, or court rule, a hearing is open
to the public." Section (c)(3) provides that a hearing may be closed to the
public if: "allowing the hearing, or part of the hearing, to be open to the public
would reasonably be expected to (A) stigmatize or be emotionally damaging
to a child; (B) inhibit a child's testimony in that hearing; (C) disclose matters
otherwise required to be kept confidential by state or federal statute or
regulation, court order, or court rule; or (D) interfere with a criminal
investigation or . . . a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial in a criminal
proceeding."). ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-525 (2012) ("Except as otherwise
provided pursuant to this section, court proceedings relating to dependent
children, . . . are open to the public. .. . For good cause shown, the court may
order any proceeding to be closed to the public. In considering whether to
close the proceeding to the public, the court shall consider:" (1) "[w]hether
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doing so is in the child's best interests;" (2) "[w]hether an open proceeding
would endanger the child's physical or emotional well-being or the safety of
any other person;" (3) "[t]he privacy rights of the child, the child's siblings,
parents, guardians and caregivers and any other person whose privacy rights
the court determines need protection;" (4) "[w]hether all parties have agreed
to allow the proceeding to be open;" (5) "[i]f the child is at least twelve years
of age and a party to the proceeding, the child's wishes;" (6) "[w]hether an
open proceeding could cause specific material harm to a criminal
investigation."); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-78 (West 2012) ("The general public
shall be admitted to . .. [any hearing in a deprivation proceeding, except as
otherwise provided in subsection (c) of this Code section. . . . The court may
close the hearing in a deprivation proceeding only upon making a finding
upon the record and issuing a signed order as to the reason or reasons for
closing all or part of a hearing in such proceeding and stating that: (A) The
proceeding involves an allegation of an act which, if done by an adult, would
constitute a sexual offense . . . or (B) It is in the best interest of the child. In
making such a determination, the court shall consider such factors as: (i) The
age of the child; (ii) The nature of the allegations; (iii) The effect that an open
court proceeding will have on the court's ability to reunite and rehabilitate the
family unit; and (iv) Whether the closure is necessary to protect the privacy of
a child, of a foster parent or other caretaker of a child, or of a victim of
domestic violence."); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.92 (West 2012) ("Hearings
under this division are open to the public unless the court, on the motion of
any of the parties or upon the court's own motion, excludes the public. The
court shall exclude the public from a hearing if the court determines that the
possibility of damage or harm to the child outweighs the public's interest in
having an open hearing. Upon closing the hearing to the public, the court may
admit those persons who have direct interest in the case or in the work of the
court."); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2247 (West 2012) ("Proceedings prior to and
including adjudication under this code shall be open to attendance by any
person unless the court determines that closed proceedings would be in the
best interests of the child or is necessary to protect the privacy rights of the
parents.... Proceedings pertaining to the disposition of a child adjudicated to
be in need of care shall be closed to all persons except the parties, the
guardian ad litem, interested parties and their attorneys, officers of the court,
a court appointed special advocate and the custodian. (1) Other persons may
be permitted to attend with the consent of the parties or by order of the court,
if the court determines that it would be in the best interests of the child or the
conduct of the proceedings, subject to such limitations as the court determines
to be appropriate. (2) The court may exclude any person if the court
determines that such person's exclusion would be in the best interests of the
child or the conduct of the proceedings."); N.Y. R. CT. § 205.4 (West 2012)
("Members of the public, including the news media, shall have access to all
courtrooms, lobbies, public waiting areas and other common areas of the
Family Court otherwise open to individuals having business before the court . .
STRIKING A BALANCE
A. North Carolina: A Presumptively Open Example
North Carolina's approach to access to juvenile dependency
hearings is a model example of a presumptively open dependency
hearing law that effectively balances the competing privacy and
First Amendment interests at stake in dependency hearings.253
Under the juvenile code chapter of the North Carolina General
Statutes, "[a]t any hearing authorized or required under this
Subchapter, the court in its discretion shall determine whether the
hearing or any part of the hearing shall be closed to the public." 25 4
There are several factors that the court shall consider in deciding
whether to close all or any part of the hearing, including:
(1) The nature of the allegations against the
juvenile's parent, guardian, custodian or
caretaker; (2) The age and maturity of the
juvenile; (3) The benefit to the juvenile of
confidentiality; (4) The benefit to the juvenile
of an open hearing; and (5) The extent to which
.. The general public or any person may be excluded from a courtroom only if
the judge presiding in the courtroom determines, on a case-by-case basis based
upon supporting evidence, that such exclusion is warranted in that case. In
exercising this inherent and statutory discretion, the judge may consider,
among other factors, whether: (1) the person is causing or is likely to cause a
disruption in the proceedings; (2) the presence of the person is objected to by
one of the parties, including the attorney for the child, for a compelling
reason; (3) the orderly and sound administration of justice, including the
nature of the proceeding, the privacy interests of individuals before the court,
and the need for protection of the litigants, in particular, children, from harm
requires that some or all observers be excluded from the courtroom; (4) less
restrictive alternatives to exclusion are unavailable or inappropriate to the
circumstances of the particular case."); UTAH CODE ANN, § 78A-6-114(1)(a)
(West 2012) ("In abuse, neglect, and dependency cases the court shall admit
any person to a hearing, . . . unless the court makes a finding upon the record
that the person's presence at the hearing would: (A) be detrimental to the best
interest of a child who is a party to the proceedings; (B) impair the fact-finding
process; or (C) be otherwise contrary to the interests of justice.").
252. KAPALKO, supra note 124, at 26 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-801
(2012)).
253. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-801 (2012).
254. Id, § 7B-801(a).
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the confidentiality afforded the juvenile's
record pursuant to G.S. 132-1.4(I) and G.S. 7B-
2901 will be compromised by an open
hearing.
Additionally, the statute makes clear that "[n]o hearing or part of a
hearing shall be closed by the court if the juvenile requests that it
remain open.", 6
Thus, the North Carolina statute allows for juvenile
dependency hearings to be presumptively open, but the
presumption may be overcome if the judge finds that closing the
hearing to the public is necessary in light of the various factors
listed above.257 The statute enables courts to employ a balancing
test to determine if the privacy interests of the child outweigh the
First Amendment interests of the press and public, or vice versa.
Hypothetically, the judge could find that the nature of the
allegations against the child's parents are rather minimal, the child
is of a mature enough age to permit public attendance at the
proceeding, the benefit of confidentially is not significant, the child
may actually benefit from an open hearing, and the child's record
would not be largely affected by an open hearing. In this scenario, it
is likely that a judge would decide that the First Amendment
interests of the press and public outweigh the privacy interests of
the child, and therefore, the proceeding should remain open.
Additionally, if the child requested that the hearing remain open,
this alone would be sufficient for the judge to permit press and
public access. On the other hand, if the scale tipped the other way,
such that the nature of the allegations were severe, the child was
very young, the child could greatly benefit from confidentiality, the
child would likely be harmed from an open hearing, and the child's
record would be compromised by an open hearing, then it is
probable that a judge would determine that the privacy interests of
the child far outweighed the First Amendment interests of the press
and public. As a result, the judge would be inclined to close the
proceeding to the press and public.
255. Id.
256. Id. § 7B-801(b).
257. Id. § 7B-801.
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A court's careful consideration of all of the factors listed in
the North Carolina statute would undoubtedly help to lessen the
three major concerns voiced by opponents of open proceedings: the
harmful impact of openness on the privacy, mental health, and
courtroom participation of the child.2s By applying a balancing test,
courts will be able to properly determine whether these rationales
for keeping the courtroom closed outweigh the reasons for keeping
the courtroom open. If the judge does indeed find that an open
proceeding would negatively affect the child's privacy, mental
health, and courtroom participation, the statute allows the judge to
close the proceeding. In contrast, if the possible adverse effects of
open proceedings on the child are rather minor or nonexistent, the
court may choose to maintain an open courtroom.
In order to increase accountability in juvenile dependency
proceedings, ensure that courtroom procedures are efficiently and
effectively executed, and facilitate public education, which can
often lead to societal reform,2 59 states should adopt statutes similar
to that of North Carolina, and grant a presumption of open access
rebuttable upon the showing of certain factors that justify the court
closing the proceedings.
B. Ethical Considerations
Simply amending statutory language, however, will not
always be enough to shift the mindsets of those opposed to open
juvenile dependency courtrooms.260 A central component of the
issue - particularly evident in the rationales set forth in favor of
presumptively closed courtrooms - is a common preconceived
mistrust of the media.2 6' While concerns that the press may overstep
258. See supra Part IV.A.
259. See supra Part IV.B.
260. Heimpel, supra note 8 (positing that: "Regardless of whether or not
state law opens the courts to the news media, the judges, commissioners and
referees that oversee these hearings have the power to do so. So what would it
take to make them feel comfortable enough to allow a journalist in?").
261. Id. (noting that "[in the six years that I have covered the foster care
system and worked along its fractious point of contact with the news media, an
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their boundaries and report on confidential information are
reasonable, it is rare that intrusive reporting actually occurs in the
262juvenile dependency setting. Nonetheless, to reduce any such
risk, a code of ethics has been proposed by a group of journalists to
ensure that the press respects the privacy interests of the children in
their reporting.263 The essential purpose of this code is to ensure
that "[w]hen courts do allow members of the press to attend
hearings, journalists must behave ethically in order to earn trust,
improve coverage, and avoid harming children and families."264 This
draft code of ethics consists of three sections: (1) professional
protocol for hearings; (2) working with children and families; and
(3) system-wide understanding.265 Each section is intended to
guarantee that the media acts ethically when reporting on juvenile
dependency proceedings.2 66
Recently, the effectiveness of this draft code of ethics was
tested by Daniel Heimpel, a journalist and the Executive Director
of Fostering Media Connections, an organization dedicated to
bringing awareness and positive change to the foster care system
all-too-common theme has been one of mistrust, fear and subsequent
misinformation").
262. See KAPALKO, supra note 124, at 13 ("The risks are not as
significant as opponents claim. Journalists, particularly those who cover the
child welfare system, are sensitive to children's vulnerabilities and are not the
exploitative 'vultures' opponents describe.") (citation omitted).
263. See generally JAMIE KAPALKO, FOSTERING MEDIA CONNECTIONS:
CODE OF ETHICS FOR JOURNALISM ON THE DEPENDENCY COURT SYSTEM, A
WATCHED SYSTEM, 2012 (2012), available at
http://fosteringmediaconnections.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/A-Watched-
System-Code-of-Ethics.pdf.
264. Id. at 2.
265. Id. at 3-5.
266. Id. at 2 ("This code of ethics seeks to define ethical behavior with
respect to some of the common issues faced by journalists attending
dependency court hearings. It requires journalists to treat their subjects with
respect and compassion. It prioritizes the needs of children ahead of the
journalist's story. It demands a great deal of research and encourages
journalists to establish relationships with other individuals working in the
system.").
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with the assistance of journalism and media outlets.267 Heimpel was
permitted to attend the juvenile dependency proceedings in Marin
County, California,268 which is a presumptively closed state-with
Los Angeles County being the most recent exception.269 After
giving a copy of the code of ethics to the clerk of court and
explaining his intent to abide by the code of ethics, Heimpel was
270granted access to the courtroom.
Despite Heimpel's successful attempt to gain access to the
courtroom, the question remains: "should fjournalists] have to
negotiate this access every time?" 27' The answer for Heimpel and
others in favor of presumptively open proceedings is "no." 272 If
journalists and other media sources adhere to strict ethical
standards, then their reporting will reflect this.273 As a result, it is
probable that the public will begin to lose their skepticism and
214
acquire more trust for the media. As Heimpel emphasizes:
With a consensus-built code of ethics in our
hand, we will have created an opportunity to
make an important bargain between the foster
care system and the news media. Both
professions will be improved for it: child
welfare shedding fear and journalism raising its
ethical standards, offering the chance for
everyone to do their best work in the best
interest of children.275
For members of the press, consistently following legitimate moral
principles when reporting on juvenile dependency proceedings may
negate the traditional mistrust of the news media and spark more
267. Heimpel, supra note 8; see also About Us, FOSTERING MEDIA
CONNECTIONS, http://fosteringmediaconnections.orgabout-us/ (last visited
Feb. 5, 2013).
268. Heimpel, supra note 8.
269. See supra Part III.B.
270. Heimpel, supra note 8.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
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states to move from presumptively closed courtrooms to
presumptively open courtrooms.276
VI. CONCLUSION
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution
guarantees freedom of the press. Until the Supreme Court
determines whether the First Amendment's press protections and
right of public access to adult criminal proceedings correspondingly
applies to juvenile dependency proceedings, the decision will be
one for each individual state to make.27 8 Each state should adopt an
approach that allows for juvenile dependency courtrooms to be
presumptively open to the press and public. However, this
presumption should come with a balancing test, conducted on a
case-by-case basis, in which the court weighs several factors,
including the privacy interests of the child and the First
Amendment rights of the press, in order to determine whether the
courtroom should remain open.
Recent events have shown that when the press is granted
access to the courtroom, it is capable of reporting accurately on the
court proceedings without exposing the most private aspects of
individuals' lives. 27 9 As long as the press maintains a set of ethical
reporting standards in the courtroom and judges are afforded
discretion in assessing whether a courtroom should be closed due to
the effects on children involved in the cases2 0 there is no genuine
reason why juvenile dependency proceedings should not adhere to
276. See KAPALKO, supra note 263, at 2.
277. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
278. See generally KAPALKO, supra note 124 (reporting on the variance
among state laws regarding press access to juvenile dependency proceedings).
279. See discussion supra Part I.
280. This is assuming that the child involved in the case is not old or
mature enough to make this decision herself. If the child is capable of deciding
and expresses that the press and public not be allowed in the courtroom, this
should be sufficient for a judge to deny access to the press and public. If, on
the other hand, the child is capable of deciding and requests that the press and
public be present during the proceedings, then, as articulated under North
Carolina's statute, the hearing should remain open to the press and public. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-801 (2012).
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one of the central facets of the First Amendment by embracing a
presumption of openness.
